Accountability Culture in Companies

Thesis

An accountability culture is not synonymous with constant pressure, micromanagement, or a search for scapegoats. It is the collective ability of an organisation to set clear expectations, review performance with predictable cadence, and apply fair consequences—both positive and negative—in a proportional and constructive manner. In Portuguese companies, especially SMEs, which represent 99.9% of the business landscape and employ the majority of the workforce, the absence of structured accountability is one of the main causes of strategic drift, succession failure, and difficulty in retaining qualified talent.

The central question is not whether accountability matters—that is widely accepted. The question is how to build it without falling into three common traps: turning accountability into disguised micromanagement, confusing metrics with clarity, or creating a blame culture where employees hide problems for fear of retaliation. Family businesses, which account for around 75% of Portuguese companies and generate approximately 65% of national GDP according to the Family Business Association, face an additional challenge: overlapping roles between owner, manager, and family member dilute clarity over who is accountable for what, when, and with what consequence.

This article develops six critical dimensions. First, it clarifies what accountability is and is not, distinguishing it from blame and control. Second, it traces the genealogy of the concept from Drucker’s management by objectives to contemporary governance models. Third, it synthesises international evidence on the pillars of healthy accountability: clarity of expectations, cadence of review, and fair consequence. Fourth, it analyses the Portuguese case with data from INE, IAPMEI, and the Family Business Association, showing where Portugal is ahead or behind what the literature prescribes. Fifth, it identifies four critical mechanisms that define accountability in practice—not a checklist, but tensions each organisation resolves in its own way. Sixth, it offers implications for decision-making and diagnostic questions that boards and senior management can use internally.

Genealogy of the Concept

The modern idea of organisational accountability has its roots in the Management by Objectives (MBO) movement formalised by Peter Drucker in the 1950s. Drucker argued that employees should participate in setting their own objectives and that management should evaluate performance against these agreed objectives, not against arbitrary or subjective criteria. This was the first conceptual step in separating accountability from pure hierarchical authority: being accountable for results requires prior clarity about what is expected.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the concept evolved with the emergence of corporate governance frameworks. The separation between ownership and management in listed companies created the need for formal accountability mechanisms: independent boards of directors, audit committees, mandatory quarterly reports. Accountability became synonymous with transparency and fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. This view dominated Anglo-Saxon literature and influenced governance codes across Europe, including Portugal.

The Balanced Scorecard by Robert Kaplan and David Norton, published in the Harvard Business Review in 1992, introduced a critical shift: accountability could not be limited to financial metrics. Kaplan and Norton proposed four perspectives—financial, customer, internal processes, and learning/growth—arguing that managers should be accountable for balanced indicators that translate strategy into operational action. This framework democratised accountability: it was not only the CEO who answered to the board, but each area manager who was accountable for specific KPIs aligned with the overall strategy.

The 2000s brought two new tensions. First, corporate scandals (Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat) exposed the limits of formal accountability without an underlying ethical culture. Regulators responded with stricter legislation (Sarbanes-Oxley in the US, European governance directives), but management literature began to distinguish accountability from compliance: following rules does not guarantee genuine responsibility. Second, the rise of agile methodologies and tech startups challenged hierarchical models of accountability. Self-organised teams, two-week sprints, continuous retrospectives—these practices suggested that accountability could be horizontal and iterative, not just vertical and annual.

Today, the literature converges on three pillars. First, clarity: accountability requires explicit, measurable, and agreed expectations. Second, cadence: accountability is not an annual event, but a rhythm of check-ins, reviews, and adjustments. Third, fair consequence: recognising success and correcting deviation in a proportional, predictable, and documented way. These pillars appear in John Kotter (1996) on organisational change, Patrick Lencioni on team dysfunctions, and recent research on psychological safety (Amy Edmondson, Harvard). The fundamental shift: healthy accountability is not imposed top-down, but co-constructed with the teams who will be held accountable.

International Evidence

Research on organisational accountability is divided into three main streams: studies on corporate governance, literature on performance management, and research on organisational culture. Each stream offers complementary evidence, but rarely integrated.

Governance and Formal Accountability

Studies on boards of directors show that formal accountability—separation of CEO/Chairman, independent audit committees, mandatory quarterly reports—is associated with lower probability of fraud and greater financial transparency, but not necessarily with better operational performance. A meta-analysis by Dalton et al. (1998) on board structure in listed companies found weak correlations between board independence and financial metrics. The most accepted explanation: formal governance prevents major deviations, but does not replace strategic leadership or execution culture.

In unlisted SMEs, evidence suggests that formal accountability is rare but impactful when implemented. A study by Songini and Gnan (2015) on Italian family businesses showed that introducing advisory boards with external members increased professionalisation, role clarity, and succession preparation. Portugal shares structural characteristics with Italy—high concentration of family businesses, low separation of ownership and management—suggesting the Italian evidence is directly relevant.

Performance Management and KPIs

The literature on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Objectives and Key Results (OKRs) is vast but fragmented. Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996) argued that balanced metrics—financial and non-financial—improve strategic alignment and accountability. Subsequent empirical studies confirmed that companies with formal scorecards have greater clarity of priorities, but the correlation with financial performance is inconsistent. A review by Ittner and Larcker (2003) concluded that most companies fail in implementation: they choose the wrong metrics, do not link KPIs to incentives, or abandon the system after 18-24 months.

OKRs, popularised by Google and other tech companies, promise more agile accountability: quarterly objectives, frequent reviews, radical transparency. Systematic evidence is scarce—most studies are single cases or self-reported. An article by Niven and Lamorte (2016) on OKR adoption in 150 US companies found that 60% reported greater clarity of priorities, but only 30% maintained the system after two years. The main reason for abandonment: administrative overload and lack of connection to real consequences (remuneration, promotion, recognition).

Organisational Culture and Psychological Safety

Amy Edmondson (Harvard) has shown in multiple studies that psychological safety—the belief that one will not be punished for speaking up, questioning, or admitting mistakes—is a necessary condition for healthy accountability. Teams with high psychological safety report more problems, learn faster, and perform better in the long term. Teams with low psychological safety hide failures, avoid feedback, and enter blame cycles. Edmondson argues that accountability without safety breeds fear; safety without accountability breeds complacency. The balance is difficult but measurable through validated surveys.

Research on feedback and performance appraisal reinforces this point. A study by Pulakos et al. (2015) on performance management practices in 437 US companies showed that annual appraisal systems with forced rankings are associated with lower engagement and higher turnover. Companies that replaced annual reviews with quarterly development conversations reported greater clarity of expectations and less resistance to feedback. However, the transition requires intensive manager training in difficult conversations—an investment many SMEs do not make.

Consequences and Incentives

The literature on variable remuneration and incentives is extensive but controversial. Classic studies (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) argued that pay-for-performance aligns the interests of managers and shareholders. More recent research (Larkin et al., 2012) shows that poorly calibrated incentives generate dysfunctional behaviours: gaming metrics, excessive short-term focus, erosion of collaboration. The evidence converges on one point: incentives reinforce accountability when three conditions are met—metrics are controllable by the individual, targets are challenging but achievable, and there is periodic review to adjust outdated targets.

In SMEs, variable remuneration is less common but not absent. OECD data (2018) show that about 40% of European SMEs use some form of bonus linked to individual or team performance, but most do not document criteria transparently. This creates a perception of arbitrariness and undermines accountability: employees do not know exactly what determines their bonus, so cannot optimise behaviour predictably.

Summary of the Evidence

Three conclusions emerge from the international literature. First, formal accountability (governance, KPIs, appraisals) is necessary but not sufficient—without a culture of psychological safety and constructive conversations, it becomes bureaucracy or a source of fear. Second, metrics should be few, controllable, and reviewed frequently—more than five KPIs per person creates confusion, not clarity. Third, consequences (positive and negative) should be proportional, predictable, and documented—arbitrariness destroys accountability faster than total absence of consequences.

The Portuguese Case

Portugal presents structural characteristics that make building accountability especially challenging and especially necessary. According to INE, in 2024 there were 532,174 non-financial companies in Portugal, of which 99.9% are SMEs. These SMEs generated in 2023 an aggregate turnover of approximately €319.2 billion and a gross value added of about €93.5 billion. The concentration in micro and small companies is extreme: of the 13,394 companies recognised as PME Líder 2024 by IAPMEI, 71.9% are small (10-49 employees), 22.3% medium (50-249), and only 5.8% micro.

Family businesses dominate the corporate landscape. The Family Business Association estimates they represent about 75% of all companies and generate approximately 65% of national GDP. This family concentration has direct implications for accountability: owner, manager, and family roles overlap, creating ambiguity over who is accountable for what. Strategic decisions mix business criteria with family dynamics, and the absence of formal governance—independent boards, advisory committees, succession protocols—is the norm, not the exception.

Data from Banco de Portugal and CMVM show that separation between ownership and management is rare outside listed companies. Portugal has only about 40 companies listed on Euronext Lisbon with significant liquidity, and even in these, shareholder concentration is high. This means that most Portuguese companies do not face external pressure (capital markets, institutional investors) to formalise accountability. In practice, accountability is internal and informal—which can work while the company is small and the founder is active, but becomes unsustainable as the company grows or prepares for succession.

International comparison reinforces this diagnosis. OECD data on management practices in European SMEs show that Portugal is below average in three areas: formalisation of performance appraisal processes, use of documented KPIs, and existence of written succession plans. At the same time, Portugal is above average in business longevity (many family businesses over 50 years old) and employee loyalty (turnover below the European average in traditional sectors). This suggests that informal accountability—based on personal relationships, trust, and shared history—works up to a point, but does not scale.

Traditional Portuguese sectors—footwear, textiles, automotive components, wine, agri-food—illustrate this tension. According to APICCAPS, the footwear industry exports 90% of its production and employs about 40,000 people, but most companies are family-owned, second or third generation. Accountability is often tacit: the founder or successor knows each employee, monitors production daily, and makes quick decisions without the need for formal KPIs. This model works while the leader is present and the company remains a manageable size. When the company grows, internationalises, or prepares for succession, the absence of structured accountability becomes a critical bottleneck.

IAPMEI data on PME Líder 2024 offer a more optimistic perspective. Companies recognised as PME Líder have an average financial autonomy of 59.4%, export significantly above average, and employ more than 429,000 people. These companies, by definition, have professionalised management and adopted more formal governance practices. The correlation is not causal, but suggests that structured accountability—clarity of roles, documented KPIs, review cadence—is associated with better performance and resilience in Portuguese SMEs.

Finally, Portugal faces a demographic challenge that makes accountability even more critical: an ageing business population and shortage of qualified talent. INE data show that the unemployment rate fell to 5.8% in the fourth quarter of 2025, but technology and qualified service sectors report chronic difficulty in recruiting and retaining talent. Companies with clear accountability—explicit expectations, regular feedback, fair consequences—have a competitive advantage in attraction and retention. Companies without structured accountability lose talent to multinationals or emigration, perpetuating the cycle of low productivity.

Four Critical Dimensions

Building an accountability culture requires resolving four fundamental tensions. These are not sequential steps or a checklist—they are dilemmas each organisation resolves in its own way, with explicit trade-offs.

Clarity vs. Flexibility: How Much Detail Is Enough

Accountability requires clarity of expectations: who is accountable for what, when, and by what metric. But too much clarity—20-page job descriptions, KPIs for every task, processes documented to the last detail—destroys autonomy and responsiveness to unforeseen events. The tension is real: SMEs operate in volatile environments where priorities change rapidly, but without minimum clarity, employees do not know if they are doing the right work.

The solution is not to choose an extreme. It is to define clarity in layers. First level: annual or quarterly strategic objectives, agreed between leadership and each functional area. These should be SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-bound) and limited to 3-5 per area. Second level: operational KPIs that translate strategic objectives into weekly or monthly metrics. Third level: job descriptions that define main responsibilities and decision authority, but do not prescribe every task. Fourth level: tactical autonomy—how to achieve objectives is left to the team, with periodic progress reviews.

Useful tools include the RACI matrix (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed) to map responsibilities in cross-functional projects, and the Balanced Scorecard to translate strategy into operational objectives. But the tool does not replace the conversation: clarity is born from dialogue between manager and employee about what is priority, what is secondary, and what can be ignored. Companies that document expectations without this dialogue generate bureaucracy; companies that rely only on conversations without documentation generate ambiguity when people change or memory fails.

Cadence vs. Overload: How Much Reporting Is Productive

Accountability requires a review cadence: regular check-ins to compare actual vs. planned, identify deviations, and adjust actions. But too much cadence—daily stand-ups without purpose, weekly reports no one reads, status update meetings without decisions—creates fatigue and takes time away from execution. The tension is especially acute in SMEs where managers juggle multiple roles and time is the scarcest resource.

The solution is to calibrate cadence by level of uncertainty and impact. Critical projects with high uncertainty (product launch, entry into a new market, post-acquisition integration) justify weekly or even daily check-ins. Stable operations with low variability (serial production, monthly invoicing, preventive maintenance) work with monthly or quarterly reviews. The common mistake is to apply the same cadence to everything—either weekly meetings for all, or no formal review until the annual appraisal.

Effective cadence combines three rhythms. First, weekly team check-ins (15-30 minutes) focused on blockers and tactical adjustments—not reporting progress, but resolving impediments. Second, monthly KPI reviews (60-90 minutes) with pre-shared data, focus on significant deviations, and documented corrective decisions. Third, quarterly objective reviews (half or full day) to review strategy, adjust priorities, and renew commitment. This tripartite model appears in agile methodologies (Scrum, Kanban) and in top management practices of high-performing companies.

Digital tools—BI dashboards, OKR software, project management platforms—increase transparency and reduce meeting preparation time, but do not replace structured conversations. Data without dialogue generates divergent interpretations; dialogue without data generates untested opinions. The combination is what creates real accountability. For more on the relationship between reporting automation and management time, see financial reporting automation in SMEs.

Consequence vs. Psychological Safety: How to Correct Without Punishing

Accountability requires consequence: recognising success and correcting deviation in a proportional and predictable way. But poorly calibrated consequence—disproportionate punishment, public blame, zero tolerance for error—destroys psychological safety and leads to problem concealment. The tension is fundamental: without consequence, accountability is rhetoric; with excessive consequence, it becomes fear.

The solution is to distinguish three types of deviation. First, deviation due to lack of effort or competence—the employee did not do what was agreed, without valid justification. Here, consequence should be clear: direct feedback, documented improvement plan, and if it persists, formal consequences (no bonus renewal, change of role, ultimately exit). Second, deviation due to unforeseen context—the employee did what was agreed, but the context changed (client cancelled, supplier failed, regulation changed). Here, consequence is learning: what did we not anticipate, how do we adjust, what changes in the plan. Third, deviation due to conscious experimentation—the employee tried a new approach, it did not work, but something useful was learned. Here, consequence is recognition: valuing the attempt, documenting the learning, incorporating it into the next cycle.

Companies with healthy accountability make this distinction explicit. They do not tolerate chronic underperformance, but do not punish honest mistakes or failed experimentation. This requires leadership maturity: the ability to have difficult conversations without humiliation, to document performance patterns without creating a surveillance climate, to dismiss when necessary but in a fair and transparent way. Formal Performance Improvement Plans (PIPs) are a useful tool when applied with genuine coaching, not as a bureaucratic prelude to dismissal.

Variable remuneration linked to KPIs reinforces accountability when well calibrated: challenging but achievable targets, transparent criteria, periodic review of outdated targets. But poorly designed incentives generate gaming: employees optimise the metric, not the business outcome. Classic example: a call centre with an average call time KPI incentivises employees to hang up quickly, not to solve the customer’s problem. The solution is to combine output metrics (sales, production) with quality metrics (customer satisfaction, error rate) and review the system annually based on observed behaviours.

Individual vs. Collective Accountability: Who Is Responsible When the Team Fails

Accountability can be individual (each person is accountable for their KPIs) or collective (the team is accountable for a shared result). Both are necessary, but generate tensions. Purely individual accountability encourages local optimisation and undermines collaboration: everyone focuses on their KPI, ignores colleagues’ requests for help, avoids cross-functional projects. Purely collective accountability dilutes responsibility: when everyone is accountable, no one is—the classic free-rider problem in economics.

The solution is to combine both with explicit weightings. Example: a product manager’s variable remuneration may be 60% linked to individual KPIs (on-time launch, product margin) and 40% to company KPIs (total revenue, overall customer satisfaction). This aligns individual incentive with collective success, but maintains clarity of personal responsibility. The weighting varies by role: salespeople tend to have a higher individual weighting (commission per sale), R&D teams a higher collective weighting (project success), top management a higher weighting on company results.

Cross-functional projects require matrix accountability: each workstream has an individual accountable (Accountable in RACI), but the final result is collective. This works when there is an executive sponsor to arbitrate conflicts, joint review cadence, and a healthy escalation culture—problems are reported early, not hidden until crisis. Companies without this culture tend to avoid cross-functional projects or execute them dysfunctionally, with silos blaming each other for delays.

Finally, collective accountability requires radical transparency: everyone sees everyone’s KPIs, not just their own. This generates peer pressure that can be more effective than hierarchical pressure. High-performing teams self-regulate: members hold each other accountable for unmet commitments, without the need for manager intervention. But transparency without psychological safety generates toxic comparison and destructive internal competition. The balance is delicate and requires leadership modelling: admitting one’s own mistakes publicly, celebrating others’ success, correcting deviations privately before escalating to public.

Implications for Decision-Making

For CEOs, CFOs, and boards, building an accountability culture is not an HR project—it is a strategic enabler. Companies that scale, internationalise, or prepare for succession without structured accountability face three predictable risks: strategic drift (priorities change without conscious decision), operational silos (areas optimise locally, ignoring global impact), and talent loss (qualified employees leave for environments with clarity and recognition).

First implication: diagnosis before intervention. Many companies confuse symptoms (unproductive meetings, chronic delays, interdepartmental conflicts) with causes. Symptoms may have multiple causes—lack of clarity, inadequate cadence, arbitrary consequences, or simply lack of technical capacity. A useful diagnosis answers four questions: can each employee list their 3-5 main KPIs and know how they are measured? Is there a formal review cadence with minutes and follow-up? Does the company document and communicate consequences consistently? Does top leadership publicly account for its own objectives? If the answer to any of these is no, there is a structural accountability gap.

Second implication: phased intervention, not big-bang. Implementing accountability across the whole company at once generates resistance and overload. More effective approach: pilot in 1-2 critical areas (sales, operations, product), learn over 3-6 months, adjust the model based on feedback, then gradual roll-out. The pilot should include three elements: co-design of KPIs with the team (not top-down imposition), manager training in constructive feedback conversations, and quarterly review of the accountability system itself (meta-learning). This iterative model appears in successful cultural transformation processes.

Third implication: investment in leadership capacity. Accountability does not work if managers do not know how to have difficult conversations, give constructive feedback, or document performance patterns. Typical training includes: feedback techniques (SBI model—Situation, Behavior, Impact), conducting structured one-on-ones, calibrating SMART goals, and facilitating team retrospectives. This investment is especially critical in family businesses where managers rise through family ties, not leadership competence. For context on leadership challenges in succession, see emergency protocol for unplanned succession.

Fourth implication: technology as enabler, not solution. Dashboards, OKR software, and project management platforms increase transparency and reduce administrative friction, but do not create accountability. Companies that implement tools without changing conversations and behaviours only generate more digital bureaucracy. The correct sequence: define the accountability model (clarity, cadence, consequence), test in a pilot with simple tools (Excel, Google Sheets, structured meetings), then choose technology that automates what already works manually. For process automation analysis, see RPA business case for CFOs.

Fifth implication: accountability of top leadership. The most common model in SMEs: employees are accountable for KPIs, but the CEO or founder is not formally accountable to anyone. This generates cynicism and undermines the credibility of any accountability system. Solution: advisory board with external members, quarterly meetings where the CEO presents progress against strategic objectives, and public documentation (to the company) of leadership commitments. A formal board of directors as in listed companies is not necessary, but some mechanism of external accountability is critical to model desired behaviour.

Finally, the trade-off between speed and consensus. Building accountability takes time: conversations to co-design KPIs, pilots to test the model, iterations to adjust. Companies in crisis or under extreme competitive pressure may not have this time. In these cases, a directive (top-down) approach may be necessary in the short term, but should be explicitly temporary and followed by a participative phase as soon as pressure eases. Imposed accountability without buy-in generates superficial compliance; co-constructed accountability generates genuine ownership. The choice depends on context, but should be conscious.

Where the Topic Is Fragile

The literature on organisational accountability has three important limitations. First, survivorship bias: studies tend to analyse successful companies that already have structured accountability, not those that failed due to its absence. This makes it difficult to isolate causality—did accountability generate success, or do successful companies simply have resources to invest in formal systems? Controlled experimental evidence is rare because it is neither ethical nor practical to randomise companies into treatment and control groups.

Second limitation: cultural context. Most research is Anglo-Saxon (US, UK) or Nordic (Sweden, Denmark), with organisational cultures of low hierarchical distance and high tolerance for direct confrontation. Generalising to high hierarchical distance contexts (Southern Europe, Asia, Latin America) is risky. Portugal, specifically, has a culture of strong personal relationships and indirect confrontation—constructive feedback may be interpreted as a personal attack, and radical transparency may cause discomfort. This does not invalidate the principles of accountability, but requires adaptation in form: one-on-one conversations before public discussion, emphasis on collective learning rather than individual blame, and time to build trust before introducing formal consequences.

Third limitation: focus on large companies and tech startups. The Balanced Scorecard was designed for multinational corporations; OKRs for fast-growing, venture-backed startups. Traditional SMEs—manufacturing, retail, local services—operate with tight margins, limited resources, and demand volatility. Implementing sophisticated accountability systems may not be viable or desirable. The question is not whether accountability matters, but what level of formalisation is appropriate for each context. A 20-person family business does not need OKR software; it needs clarity on who does what, a 30-minute weekly meeting, and honest conversations when something goes wrong.

Finally, accountability can be used as a control weapon disguised as professionalisation. Insecure founders or managers may implement excessive KPIs and reporting systems to micromanage teams, not to create autonomy. Symptoms include: metrics that change frequently without explanation, unattainable targets used to justify non-payment of bonuses, and absence of accountability for leadership itself. Diagnosing this dysfunction requires looking at behaviour patterns, not just the existence of formal systems. For analysis of control culture vs. empowerment, see literature on leadership styles and engagement.

Open Questions

Three questions remain without consensus in the literature and practice. First: what is the optimal level of accountability formalisation by company size and sector? Is there a threshold—number of employees, turnover, operational complexity—below which informal accountability is sufficient and above which formalisation is necessary? Or does it depend more on strategic ambition (growth, internationalisation, succession) than current size? Future research should map accountability practices in representative samples of Portuguese SMEs by sector and life cycle stage, not just in PME Líder or high-growth companies.

Second question: how to adapt accountability models to contexts of high uncertainty and rapid change? Balanced Scorecard and OKRs assume strategy is relatively stable over the planning horizon (year, quarter). But companies in disruptive sectors—technology, energy, digital health—face context changes that invalidate KPIs within weeks. How to maintain accountability when the very metrics of success are in flux? Emerging approaches include North Star Metrics (a main metric capturing long-term value) and monthly rather than quarterly strategic reviews, but systematic evidence is scarce. For reflection on the tension between experimentation and planning, see analysis of adaptive cultures.

Third question: what is the role of artificial intelligence and automation in future accountability? Real-time dashboards, automatic deviation alerts, predictive risk analysis—these technologies promise continuous rather than periodic accountability. But they also raise questions: does excessive monitoring create a surveillance culture? Do anomaly detection algorithms replace human judgement or merely inform it? How to ensure accountability automation does not eliminate room for context, nuance, and learning? Leading-edge companies are experimenting, but best practices have yet to crystallise. For context on automation and RPA, see impact on financial reporting.

Next Step: Executive Diagnosis

For boards and senior management who recognise accountability gaps in their organisation, the next step is not to implement a complete system—it is to accurately diagnose where the gap is and what the root cause is. Five diagnostic questions structure this process:

• Clarity: Can each employee list their 3-5 main KPIs, know how they are measured, and how often they are reviewed? If not, the gap is in clarity of expectations.
• Cadence: Is there a predictable rhythm of check-ins (weekly), KPI reviews (monthly), and objective appraisals (quarterly), with documented minutes and action follow-up? If not, the gap is in review cadence.
• Consequence: Does the company consistently document and communicate recognition of success (bonus, promotion, public recognition) and correction of deviation (feedback, improvement plan, formal consequences)? If not, the gap is in fair consequence.
• Leadership Modelling: Does top leadership publicly account (to the board, to employees) for its own objectives, admit mistakes, and accept upward feedback? If not, the gap is in credibility and modelling.
• Capacity: Do managers have training and practice in constructive feedback conversations, SMART goal calibration, and facilitation of retrospectives? If not, the gap is in leadership capacity.

Answers to these questions guide prioritisation. If the main gap is clarity, invest in co-designing KPIs with teams. If it is cadence, structure meeting rhythms and tracking tools. If it is consequence, review the variable remuneration system and promotion criteria. If it is modelling, start with accountability of the CEO and top management. If it is capacity, invest in leadership training before implementing systems.

Macro Consulting supports companies in this diagnosis and in the phased construction of accountability systems aligned with strategy and culture. Typical intervention includes: cultural diagnosis through interviews and surveys, RACI mapping of critical responsibilities, co-design of a Balanced Scorecard or adapted OKR model, leadership training in constructive feedback, pilot in 1-2 areas with quarterly follow-up, and gradual roll-out with adjustments based on learning. The goal is not to import best practices from other geographies or sectors, but to build an accountability model that works in the specific context of each company—size, sector, culture, strategic ambition.

For companies undergoing family succession, governance professionalisation, or preparation for external investment, structured accountability is not a nice-to-have—it is a viability condition. Institutional investors, strategic buyers, and professional successors expect clarity of responsibilities, documented KPIs, and review cadence. Companies that build this before starting an M&A or succession process negotiate from a position of strength; those that do so under due diligence pressure negotiate from a position of weakness.

Sources

• INE — Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2024), Empresas em Portugal 2024 (definitive data on business landscape, turnover, and GVA of SMEs), available at ine.pt
• INE — Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2023), Empresas em Portugal 2023 (aggregate turnover and GVA of SMEs), available at ine.pt
• IAPMEI (2024), Edição PME Líder 2024 (13,394 recognised companies, breakdown by size, average financial autonomy 59.4%), available at iapmei.pt
• Associação das Empresas Familiares — AEF (2024), estimates on the weight of family businesses in the Portuguese business landscape (~75%) and in national GDP (~65%)
• Kaplan, R. S. & Norton, D. P. (1992), 'The Balanced Scorecard: Measures That Drive Performance', Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb 1992
• Kotter, J. P. (1996), Leading Change, Harvard Business School Press (8-step model for organisational change management)
• Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E. & Johnson, J. L. (1998), 'Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance', Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), 269-290
• Songini, L. & Gnan, L. (2015), 'Family Involvement and Agency Cost Control Mechanisms in Family Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises', Journal of Small Business Management, 53(3), 748-779
• Ittner, C. D. & Larcker, D. F. (2003), 'Coming Up Short on Nonfinancial Performance Measurement', Harvard Business Review, Nov 2003
• Niven, P. R. & Lamorte, B. (2016), Objectives and Key Results: Driving Focus, Alignment, and Engagement with OKRs, Wiley
• Edmondson, A. C. (1999), 'Psychological Safety and Learning Behavior in Work Teams', Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 350-383
• Pulakos, E. D., Hanson, R. M., Arad, S. & Moye, N. (2015), 'Performance Management Can Be Fixed: An On-the-Job Experiential Learning Approach for Complex Behavior Change', Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 8(1), 51-76
• Jensen, M. C. & Murphy, K. J. (1990), 'Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives', Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264
• Larkin, I., Pierce, L. & Gino, F. (2012), 'The Psychological Costs of Pay-for-Performance: Implications for the Strategic Compensation of Employees', Strategic Management Journal, 33(10), 1194-1214
• OECD (2018), Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2018: An OECD Scoreboard (data on variable remuneration practices in European SMEs)
• APICCAPS — Associação Portuguesa dos Industriais de Calçado, Componentes, Artigos de Pele e seus Sucedâneos (2024), Indústria do Calçado 2024 (production, exports, employment)
• Banco de Portugal (2025), Boletim Económico Dezembro 2025 (macroeconomic projections, unemployment rate)
• Drucker, P. F. (1954), The Practice of Management, Harper & Row (seminal work on Management by Objectives)
• Lencioni, P. (2002), The Five Dysfunctions of a Team: A Leadership Fable, Jossey-Bass (model on team dysfunctions, including absence of accountability)